Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Architecture as Ethical Disciplines
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Universidad Industrial de Santander
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Es comúnmente reconocida la relación íntima que la casa que Wittgenstein construyó para su hermana guarda con el proyecto del Tractatus —un proyecto que haciendo visible el mundo tal como la ciencia lo representa, despierta en el lector la necesidad apremiante de una reorientación ética de su vida. Sin embargo, Wittgenstein llegó a percibir ambas obras como fracasos. Los objetivos de este artículo son I) dilucidar la razón (o razones) de dicho fracaso; II) argumentar que el segundo Wittgenstein no abandonó su proyecto ético, sino que modificó las estrategias para llevarlo a cabo —algo que también afectó a su concepción de la filosofía; y III) mostrar cómo Wittgenstein pudo resolver un problema básico para el conservadurismo tardío anclándolo en el orden inherente a la actividad humana ordinaria.
It is common wisdom that the house built by Wittgenstein for his sister is intimately related to the Tractarian project —one that by means of displaying the structure of the world as science finds it, was directed to create a sense of spiritual desolation, so as to awake a pressing need for ethical transformation. Eventually, Wittgenstein came to see the Tractatus and the house as failures. The aims of this article are: I) to elucidate the nature of this perceived failure; II) to argue that Wittgenstein never abandoned this ethical project, although he radically changed the means for realizing it, and consequently, his conception of philosophy; and III) to show how Wittgenstein came to solve a basic problem for late conservatism by grounding it in the inherently patterned nature of the ordinary.
It is common wisdom that the house built by Wittgenstein for his sister is intimately related to the Tractarian project —one that by means of displaying the structure of the world as science finds it, was directed to create a sense of spiritual desolation, so as to awake a pressing need for ethical transformation. Eventually, Wittgenstein came to see the Tractatus and the house as failures. The aims of this article are: I) to elucidate the nature of this perceived failure; II) to argue that Wittgenstein never abandoned this ethical project, although he radically changed the means for realizing it, and consequently, his conception of philosophy; and III) to show how Wittgenstein came to solve a basic problem for late conservatism by grounding it in the inherently patterned nature of the ordinary.