Intuition and perception in the sixth Logical Investigation of Edmund Husserl

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Universidad Industrial de Santander
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En este artículo nos concentraremos en la definición de la percepción y en su relación con la intuición. Nuestro artículo pretende investigar si existe una diferencia entre estos dos conceptos y cómo éstos trabajan. En este estudio, nos haremos uso sobre todo de Husserl, en particular de la sexta Investigación Logica. Aquí el filósofo distingue entre Anschauung (intuición) y Wahrnehmung (percepción) como dos (¿diferentes?) formas de ver y de tomar la realidad. Ambos conceptos apuntan al entendimiento de la realidad. Sin embargo, la intuición parece ser más importante que la percepción.
In this paper I would like to focus on the phenomenological definition of perception and on its relationship with intuition. Insofar these two ideas seem to play a pivotal role in the process of knowledge, we wonder if intuition has its own property or if it is a part of perception. In short we would like to understand if there is an actual difference between intuition and perception and how they work. As for the philosophical and bibliographical references, we will cite mostly the sixth Logical Investigation of Edmund Husserl. In this place Husserl sketches out Anschauung (intuition) and Wahrnehmung (perception) as two (different?) kinds of seeing and collecting reality. Both are aimed to the understanding of reality. Nevertheless, intuition seems to be posed on an higher stage than perception, since it seems to translate its Reinheit in the perceived datum.
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Husserl, conciencia, intuición, percepción, intencionalidad, Consciousness, perception, intuition, intentionality, presentification, apprehension, Objectifying acts, phenomenology
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