El conocimiento de la naturaleza en la tercera crítica de Kant
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Universidad Industrial de Santander
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Analizo la importancia que adquiere la tercera Crítica de Kant en el plano del conocimiento empírico de la naturaleza. Es cierto que los juicios estéticos y teleológicos de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar no proporcionan conocimiento de la naturaleza. No obstante, el principio de conformidad a fin que se halla en la base de dichos juicios posee importantes implicaciones para el conocimiento empírico. Con ello intento sugerir que la teoría cognoscitiva planteada en la Crítica de la razón pura fue enriquecida con los aportes propios de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, en la medida en que esta última obra muestra dimensiones del conocimiento humano que no fueron contempladas en la primera Crítica.
I analyze the importance that acquires Kant’s third Critique in the level of empirical knowledge of nature. It is true that the aesthetic and teleological judgments of the Critique of Judgment do not provide knowledge of the nature. Nevertheless, the principle of purposiveness situated in the base of the above mentioned judgments has important implications for empirical knowledge. With this I try to suggest that the cognitive theory raised in the Critique of the Pure Reason was enriched by the own contributions of the Critique of Judgment, in the measure in which the latter work shows dimensions of the human knowledge that were not contemplated in the first Critique.
I analyze the importance that acquires Kant’s third Critique in the level of empirical knowledge of nature. It is true that the aesthetic and teleological judgments of the Critique of Judgment do not provide knowledge of the nature. Nevertheless, the principle of purposiveness situated in the base of the above mentioned judgments has important implications for empirical knowledge. With this I try to suggest that the cognitive theory raised in the Critique of the Pure Reason was enriched by the own contributions of the Critique of Judgment, in the measure in which the latter work shows dimensions of the human knowledge that were not contemplated in the first Critique.
Keywords
Kant, enjuiciamiento, naturaleza, conocimiento, reglas, Kant, judgement, nature, knowledge, rules