LA JUSTICIA COMO EQUIDAD COMO UNA TEORÍA MORAL KANTIANA
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Universidad Industrial de Santander
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RESUMEN Según Rawls, la principal diferencia entre Una Teoría de la Justicia (1971) y El Liberalismo Político (1993) es que en la primera casi se presuponía que la justicia como equidad, la teoría rawlsiana de la justicia, sólo podría realizarse al costo de una unificación doctrinaria de la sociedad como un todo. Esa unificación sería kantiana. Ahora las cosas no van tan lejos: esa teoría, que es estrictamente política, podría ser apoyada por los diferentes puntos de vista que componen una sociedad pluralista. Algunos lectores de Rawls (de los cuales Richard Rorty sería el mejor ejemplo), piensan que de esta forma Rawls se ha separado radical y definitivamente de Kant. En este ensayo niego tal separación radical y explico las razones que me permiten pensar que, a pesar de su deslinde con ciertos fundamentos 'metafísicos' kantianos, la teoría de la justicia de Rawls es todavía kantiana en algún sentido.
ABSTRACT According to Rawls, the main difference between A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism(1993) is that in the first one there was a kind of (implicit) petition for a doctrinaire unification of the whole society around some Kantian moral ideas. Now Rawls claims to have removed such a requirement. Now his theory of justice, justice as fairness, could be regarded as a strictly polítical conception that can be endorsed by a pluralist society without performing any previous unification within itself. Some Rawls' s readers, Richard Rorty mainly, take this removal as a proof that Rawls has totally separated himself from Kant' s practical philosophy. In this paper I deny such a total separation and try to establish that, in spite of its detachment from the Kantian metaphysical grounds, Rawls' theory of justice is still Kantian in many ways.
ABSTRACT According to Rawls, the main difference between A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism(1993) is that in the first one there was a kind of (implicit) petition for a doctrinaire unification of the whole society around some Kantian moral ideas. Now Rawls claims to have removed such a requirement. Now his theory of justice, justice as fairness, could be regarded as a strictly polítical conception that can be endorsed by a pluralist society without performing any previous unification within itself. Some Rawls' s readers, Richard Rorty mainly, take this removal as a proof that Rawls has totally separated himself from Kant' s practical philosophy. In this paper I deny such a total separation and try to establish that, in spite of its detachment from the Kantian metaphysical grounds, Rawls' theory of justice is still Kantian in many ways.